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GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE KOREAN ECONOMY: ISSUES AND 
PERSPECTIVES
By Pyo Hak-kil
Introduction
The year 2008 will be recorded in world history 
as a year in which the global capitalist system was 
threatened as a consequence of the U.S.-originated 
financial turmoil that began with the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. The im-
pending worldwide recession is now often compared 
with the Great Depression that began in 1929. The 
repercussions of the financial turmoil from Wall 
Street have been quick and widespread around the 
globe, resulting in contraction in the real sector, 
rising unemployment, and a decrease in commodity 
prices including the price of oil. Emerging-market 
economies in particular are the hardest hit by the 
financial turmoil, with sharp reductions in stock 
prices and exchange rates.
The MSCI Emerging Markets Index1 and Developed 
Markets Index (MSCI EAFE)2 changed by –53.6 
percent and –40.9 percent, respectively, between 31 
December 2007 and 8 January 2009. The Emerg-
ing Markets Index includes the following indexes: 
Russia’s RTS (–72.4 percent), China’s Shanghai 
SE Composite (–64.3 percent), Hong Kong’s Hang 
Seng (–48.2 percent), Korea’s KOSPI (–36.4 per-
cent), and Brazil’s BOVESPA (–34.3 percent). The 
MSCI EAFE index includes Japan’s NIKKEI (–42.0 
percent), Germany’s DAX30 (–39.5 percent), the 
U.S. Dow Jones Industrials (–34.1 percent), and the 
UK’s FTSE100 (–30.2 percent).
The exchange rates of currencies of emerging-
market economies during the same period have 
depreciated significantly as foreign capital inflows 
abruptly changed to outflows as foreign investors 
started replenishing their liquidity and preferred to 
hold onto dollar-denominated assets to reduce risks 
of holding nondollar assets (Figure 1). Currencies 
include the South Korean won (–34.9 percent), the 
Indian rupee (–23.7 percent), the Russian ruble 
(–19.7 percent), the Thai baht (–3.5 percent), and 
the Taiwanese new dollar (–1.3 percent). The only 
exception to the depreciation trend was the apprecia-
tion of Chinese yuan (6.6 percent) and the Japanese 
1. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index that is designed to measure equity 
market performance in the global emerging markets. As of June 2006 the MSCI Emerging Markets Index consisted of the 
following 25 emerging-market country indices: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. 
2.  The MSCI EAFE Index (Europe, Australasia, Far East) is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index that is designed 
to measure the equity market performance of developed markets, excluding the United States & Canada. As of June 2007 the 
MSCI EAFE Index consisted of the following 21 developed market country indices: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sin-
gapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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Japanese yen 18.7
Chinese yuan 6.6
Taiwan new dollar –1.3
Thai baht –3.5
Euro –4.5
Russian ruble –19.7
Indian rupee –23.7
Australian dollar –24.2
New Zealand dollar –31.5
South Korean won –34.9
UK pound –36.0
Percent change
Figure 1: Selected Nations’ Currency Revaluation 
Rate Compared with the U.S. Dollar (zero)  
31 December 2007–31 December 2008
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream database.
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yen (18.7 percent). There was also a disparity be-
tween developed-market currencies: the UK pound 
(–36.0 percent) and the Japanese yen (18.7 percent). 
The question remains as to why the Korean won ex-
perienced the largest margin of depreciation among 
emerging-market currencies and why the KOSPI 
also fell by a substantial margin.
Imbalance between Real Sector and  
Financial Sector
Even though subprime mortgages in the United 
States had begun to surface as a potentially seri-
ous issue beginning in the second half of 2007, 
the financial turmoil manifested itself only later 
through a series of incidents such as the failure of 
Bear Stearns and the financial troubles of Freddie 
Mac during the first half of 2008. The bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers followed on 15 September 
2008, an event that preceded the bailout request by 
the three largest U.S. automobile manufacturers, 
the takeover of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America, 
and subsequent reports of huge losses by Bank of 
America and Citigroup.
A question has emerged about the fundamental 
cause of this financial malaise and impending global 
recession. There can be multiple causes and expla-
nations, but the cumulative imbalance between the 
real sector and the financial sector seems to have 
formed a core of the real cause. According to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF; see Figure 2 
excerpted from World Economic Outlook, October 
2008, figure b4.3, p. 135), labor productivity of the 
economies of a group of advanced countries, mea-
sured as the ratio of real GDP and total employment 
and representing deviations from Hodrick-Prescott 
trend, shows a sharp decline during 2003–06 after 
the information technology boom started to slow. 
During the same period, however, both monetary 
and fiscal policies were excessively expansionary. 
The lower interest rate policy, in particular, fueled 
asset markets, driving up prices of houses and stocks 
(Figure 3) and ultimately commodity prices, includ-
ing the oil price. As the asset price bubble continued 
to build, the financial industries in the United States 
started creating derivative after derivative, which 
fell outside of reserve regulations.
In short, there was a continuing speculative bubble 
in both the housing and financial sectors, which was 
not supported by a real income gain. Like the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, the cumulative imbalance 
between the real sector and the financial sector 
awakened investors to the fact that they might not 
get back their expected returns. The imbalance be-
tween the two sectors is characterized by the wage 
gap between the two sectors. How the financial 
industries could have afforded such a high wage 
scale for their professional employees for such a 
prolonged period of time is still an open question, 
especially when there was no real value-added and 
marginal productivity gain. It seems to boil down 
to the question of corporate governance and su-
pervision over secondary banking, which implies 
a system failure like the 1997 crises in Indonesia, 
South Korea, and Brazil.
When the systems failed in 1997, Indonesia, South 
Korea, and Brazil went through IMF-mandated 
Figure 2: IMF Graphs of Systemic Events Showing  
Financial Stress, 1980–2008 
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structural reform programs. But, in the case of the 
U.S. system, the IMF is not the source of a bailout; 
instead, the U.S. Congress is the ultimate source. 
It is an irony that, although the IMF conducts an 
annual consultation with the U.S. government and 
the Federal Reserve Board, it seems to have failed 
to detect the U.S. financial crisis in advance—as it 
had failed to detect the Asian financial crisis.
What Has Gone Wrong with the Won and 
the KOSPI?
The Korean economy during the first two quarters 
of 2008 maintained a resilient growth of real GDP 
with rates of 5.8 percent and 4.8 percent, which is 
roughly in the range of potential GDP growth rates, 
as shown in Table 1. Even though domestic demand 
was sluggish—with consumption at 3.4 percent and 
2.3 percent and investment at 1.4 percent and 0.7 
percent—Korea showed strong export performance 
(17.4 percent and 23.1 percent on an FOB customs 
clearance basis). In the third quarter, however, 
although investment (rising to 4.7 percent) and 
exports (27.0 percent) improved as the price of oil 
went down, consumption (which grew at a rate of 
only 1.1 percent) slowed as the global financial crisis 
became apparent and a recession was impending. 
These developments made Korea’s third and the 
fourth quarter GDP growth rate (3.8 percent and 
–3.4 percent respectively) slower than the previous 
two quarters.
In fact, at the beginning of October 2008, after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Korean financial 
market was put into a panic as the won depreci-
ated from 1,187 won per dollar in early October 
to 1,467.8 won on 28 October and then further, to 
1,513 won on 24 November. The average monthly 
stock price index fell from the peak month of May 
2008 (1,846.8), to October 2008 (1,201.7), and then 
to November 2008 (1,073.9) (Figure 4). Samsung 
Economic Research Institute (SERI) attributed the 
changes mainly to massive foreign capital outflows 
from stock and bond investments. Even though 
Korea ranks number 27 among 30 OECD countries 
in terms of financial market openness measured by 
the ratio of foreign investment inflow and nominal 
GDP, it ranks number 3 in terms of the weight in 
stock investment (39.0 percent) and number 6 in 
terms of weight in securities investment, including 
bonds (55.7 percent).3
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Source: Dow Jones and author's records
3.  “CEO Information,” Samsung Economic Research Institute, 24 December 2008.
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In 2008 (prior to 22 December), foreign investors 
in the Korean securities market are reported to have 
recorded net sales of 43.2 trillion won out of total 
holdings of 176.2 trillion won. As a consequence, 
foreign investors’ share of Korea’s stock market 
declined from 42 percent in 2004 to 29.4 percent 
in November 2008. During the period of 2 January 
2008–12 December 2008, the net sales of foreign 
investors’ stocks in seven Asian economies (Korea, 
Japan, India, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines) were $102 billion, of which the largest 
proportion was the net sales that took place in the 
Korean market, which amounted to $34 billion.
The SERI report4 points out that dollar-denominated 
transactions in Korea’s foreign exchange market 
amounted to 98 percent ($40.4 billion) of Korea’s 
total foreign exchange transactions ($41.4 billion) 
during the third quarter of 2008. This lack of de-
coupling from the dollar has made both the won 
and Korea’s stock market index very volatile at a 
time of U.S.-originated financial distress, as shown 
4. Ibid.
Table 1: Korea’s Principal Economic Indicators, 2007–08 
 
Indicators 2007 
2008 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
GDP growth rate 5.0 5.8 4.8 3.8 –3.4 
Private consumption 4.5 3.4 2.3 1.1 –4.4 
Facilities investment 7.6 1.4 0.7 4.7  –14.0 
Manufacturing output  6.9 10.9 8.9 5.6 –11.3p 
Average capacity utilization rate 80.1 80.8 80.4 78.3 69.1p 
Exchange 
rate 
Won/dollar (average rate) 929.2 956.0 1,016.7 1,062.6 1,362.8 
Yen/dollar (average rate) 789.8 909.4 972.7 988.8 1,421.4 
Interest rate 
Corporate bond (3-year, AA-, %) 5.7 6.4 6.3 7.2 8.3 
Treasury bond (3-year, %) 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.9 4.7 
Stock price index (KOSPI, average) 1,714.2 1,692.0 1,794.5 1,504.9 1,136.4 
Exports (in billions of dollars, FOB) 371.5 99.4 114.5 115.0 93.1 
Percentage change 14.1 17.4 23.1 27.0 –9.9 
Imports (in billions of dollars, CIF) 356.8 106.0 114.8 123.0 91.5 
Percentage change 15.3 28.9 30.5 43.0 –9.0 
Current account (in billions of dollars) 5.9 –5.2 –0.1 –8.6 7.5 
Unemployment rate 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.1 
Unemployed persons (per 10,000 persons) 78.3 80.1 76.7 75.2 75.7 
Consumer price index (percentage change) 2.5 1.3 2.0 1.4 –0.3 
International reserves (in billions of dollars) 262.2 264.2 258.1 239.7 201.2 
Total external liabilities (in billions of dollars) 383.2 415.8 421.7 425.5 380.5 
 
Sources: Bank of Korea; Korea National Statistical Office; Korea Customs Service. 
Note: Some data for the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2008 are preliminary estimates. 
008-014_Pyo.indd   11 5/26/2009   10:51:13 AM
12 THE KOREA ECONOMIC INSTITUTE 
in Figure 5. The report estimates the correlation 
coefficient between the won-dollar exchange rate 
and the KOSPI in 2008 was the highest in history 
(–0.89), followed by 2007 (–0.76) and 2003 (–0.48). 
In short, the strong co-movement between the de-
preciating won and Korea’s declining stock prices 
observed during the final quarter of 2008 and the 
excessive volatility in the foreign exchange market 
and stock market imply the absence of decoupling 
of the Korean markets from the U.S. markets and the 
Korean market’s overexposure to foreign portfolio 
investment. The foreign press and ratings agencies 
have voiced concern over Korea’s ability to service 
short-term debt. The Financial Times (28 November 
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Figure 4: Won-Dollar Exchange Rate and Korean Stock Market Index (KOSPI)
 1 January 2008–31 December 2008
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream database; Korea stock exchange.
Won-dollar exchange rate
(gray line)
KOSPI
(black line)
2008) pointed out that South Korea’s external debt 
swelled to $425.1 billion, an increase of $4.4 billion 
in the second quarter of 2008. Short-term debt grew 
$12.9 billion, to $189.4 billion; while long-term 
debt declined by $8.5 billion, to $235.7 billion. 
The press and ratings agencies also pointed out that 
South Korea’s loan-to-deposit ratio of 140 percent 
in the banking sector is also seen as problematic, 
outstripping other countries in the region.
The Korean government announced a $130 billion 
bailout fund in October 2008, but Fitch downgraded 
its outlook on Korea from “stable” to “negative” 
in November 2008. In addition, Fitch released the 
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Figure 5: Change per Day of Won-Dollar Exchange Rate and Change per Day of Korean Stock 
Market Index (KOSPI), 1 January 2008–31 December 2008, percentage
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream database; Korea stock exchange.
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result of its “stress test” and estimated on 12 March 
2009 that Korean lenders may suffer a combination 
of additional losses amounting to 42 trillion won by 
the end of 2010 on account of their high-risk loans 
and exposure to foreign currency assets.
Korea’s Financial Services Commission (FSC) 
disputed the Fitch result, saying, “Unlike banks 
in major developed countries, Korean lenders are 
able to boost their capital bases through common 
share offerings and have their own capacity to raise 
capital.” FSC announced the creation of a 40 trillion 
won Finance Stability Fund as a contingency plan 
and a backup measure to the bank recapitalization 
fund of the 20 trillion won ($13.5 billion) fund it 
plans to use soon. As shown in Table 1, Korea’s 
total external liabilities have been reduced from 
$425.5 billion (2008 Q3) to $380.5 billion (2008 
Q4). At the same time, the current account balance 
improved from a deficit of $–8.6 billion (2008 Q3) 
to a surplus of $7.5 billion (2008 Q4). Therefore, 
the concerns by the Financial Times and Fitch are 
not fully warranted. The Korean government, how-
ever, should pay due attention to the deleveraging 
costs of commercial banks and their relatively high 
loan-deposit ratios. 
New Economic Policy Agenda
Entering 2009, both industrial nations and emerging-
market economies have been engaging themselves 
in producing stimulus policy packages, including 
the $700 billion relief fund in the United States. 
The Korean government is also planning to lay out 
a series of economic recovery policies to protect the 
economy from further downturns and to preserve 
the potential for a sustainable growth. Even though 
the Korean government had planned for real GDP 
growth in 2009 of 2 percent, the Korea Develop-
ment Institute on 22 January 2009 released its new 
forecast of 0.7 percent.
As the world will be full of stimulus policies, there 
will be a beggar-thy-neighbor threat and a risk of 
a competitive depreciation war as each country 
promotes its exports. For example, the bailout 
attempt by the U.S government on GM and other 
automakers will inevitably induce protectionism in 
automobile imports and will delay the worldwide 
recovery through trade divergence rather than trade 
creation. We all know that the consequence of such 
policy games in the end is hyperinflation. There-
fore, it matters which economy puts forward more 
sustainable and competition-enhancing policy pack-
ages. The new economic policy agenda that should 
be pursued by a newly appointed economic policy 
team in Korea calls for a careful reexamination of 
economic stimulus packages in order to determine 
which policy is likely to enhance real productivity. 
According to the Conference Board, labor produc-
tivity in South Korea in terms of GDP per hour (in 
U.S. dollars) in 2007 was estimated to be $23.50; 
this compares with the United States ($52.10) and 
Japan ($37.10). Therefore, as their relative percent-
ages compared with the United States (100) show, 
both South Korea (45) and Japan (71) need to in-
crease their real productivity.5
In this respect, the success or failure of each coun-
try’s stimulus packages will depend on the contents 
and the quality of such policy packages. The criteria 
will be whether and how much the net results of 
stimulus policy packages have been productivity 
enhancing.
For policies such as corporate restructuring, the 
judgment must rest on whether there is a chance for 
productivity-enhancing business activity. Instead of 
ready-made policy packages, such as across-the-
board employment cuts and populist-style mass 
development projects, a more prudent research and 
development program, educational improvements, 
and expansion of on-the-job training programs 
would help to restore growth potential and preserve 
social networks. The recent news that China is plan-
ning to invest in the renovation and improvement of 
its vast educational facilities as part of its domestic 
stimulus packages deserves our special attention.
Dr. Pyo is Professor of Economics and Director 
of the Center for National Competitiveness, Seoul 
National University.
5. Bart van Ark, “Performance 2008: Productivity, Employment, and Growth in the World’s Economies” (New York, Con-
ference Board, 2008).
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